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fendant hospital's psychiatric ward. Thereafter, the assaulted visitor,
joined by her husband, commenced an action in negligence. Plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant had not properly supervised dangerous psy-
chiatric patients, and sought information concerning the assailant
patient's propensities in order to charge the defendant with prior
knowledge. Defendant, by cross motion, challenged plaintiff's notice of
discovery and inspection insofar as it related to the records on a non-
party who had not been served with notice. The appellate court con-
cluded that
[p]laintiffs [were] entitled to all non-medical data pertaining to
prior assaults or attempted assaults by the patient, including the
time and place and surrounding circumstances, together with the
date the information came within the knowledge of defendant....
[and the] length and number of times the patient was confined to
the defendant's institution.109
This disposition is laudable. The fact that the requested records
related to a non-party who had not been given notice of the action
should not bar disclosure in these circumstances.110 The defendant, in
possession and control of these records, failed to show any prejudice
to the non-party or any other reason for requiring that notice be given
to the latter where CPLR 3120 does not mandate it.
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
Collateral Estoppel: The preclusive effect of arbitration awards.
Arbitration, like litigation, may have the effect of res judicata. A
proper proceeding will bar further litigation of the same cause of
action between parties who participated in the arbitration,' as well
as estop the relitigation of issues actually determined therein.112 The
109 Id., 825 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
110 See Alamo v. New York, 51 Misc. 2d 950, 274 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1966), wherein
the state was directed to furnish at the examination before trial: (1) an assailant prisoner's
history prior to and during his stays at specified state hospitals; (2) the length of his stays
and the names and addresses of his doctors; and (3) "[a]ny nonmedical observations re-
corded in the hospitals[;]" and (4) "[o]bservations of his propensities not related to medical
and psychiatric observations, inquiry or analysis concerning [the assailant's] propensities."
Id. at 952, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 367-68.
111 Garnett v. Kassover, 8 App. Div. 2d 631, 185 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2d Dep't 1959) (mem.);
Abrams v. Macy Park Constr. Co., 282 App. Div. 922, 125 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1st Dep't 1953)
(mem.); Campe Corp. v. Pacific Mills, 275 App. Div. 634, 92 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1st Dep't 1949)(per curiam); Springs Cotton Mills v. Buster Boy Suit Co., 275 App. Div. 196, 88 N.Y.S.2d
295 (Ist Dep't), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 586, 89 N.E.2d 877 (1949) (mem.); Goldblatt v. Board of
Educ., 52 Misc. 2d 238, 275 N.Y.S.2d 550 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1966), aff'd, 57 Misc.
2d 1089, 294 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1968) (per curiam).
112 Schuykill Fuel Corp. v. B.&C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 165 N.E. 456
(1929); At Home Wear, Inc. v. S.D. Sales Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 202, 314 N.Y.S.2d 654
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
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res judicata effect, however, can be asserted only against one who has
had a full and fair opportunity to be heard; it will not bind a stranger
to the proceeding.113 In addition, judicial review is limited to questions
of fraud and mistake and the decision of the arbitrator is conclusive
as to questions of both law and fact." 4
Rochester Coca-Cola Bottling Corp. v. Rios" 5 involved the res
judicata effect of arbitration arising out of an automobile collision
between a private car and a Coca-Cola truck. In the first action, the
owner-operator of the car sued the Coca-Cola corporation and its driver
for personal injuries. The suit, which was commenced in the supreme
court, was transferred to the city court and ultimately sent to arbitra-
tion in accordance with section 213(8) of the New York Judiciary
Law." 0 The arbitration panel awarded the owner-operator, the present
defendant, $750, thereby determining that he was free from negli-
gence." 7
In the present action before the Rochester City Court, the Coca-
Cola corporation sued the defendant owner-operator for property
damage. Defendant moved for dismissal and prayed for summary judg-
ment on the ground that the former arbitration proceeding was res
judicata."3 The plaintiff-corporation argued that the issue of defen-
dant's negligence was not litigated and therefore was without preclusive
effect." 9 The court granted the defendant's motion. It reasoned that
(1) since judgments of a court are conclusive between parties and (2)
since the Judiciary Law permitted a judgment to be entered on an
arbitration award,'120 "the legal and operative effect of such a judgment
113 Madden v. Nolfo, 34 App. Div. 2d 827, 312 N.Y.S.2d 769 (2d Dep't), appeal dis-
missed, 27 N.Y.2d 741, 263 N.E.2d 389, 314 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1970) (mem.); Levin-Townsend
Computer Corp. v. Holland, 29 App. Div. 2d 925, 289 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep't 1968) (per
curiam); Solomon v. Forty-second St. Fotoshop, Inc., 72 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1947).
Where there are special circumstances, however, the courts will not be bound by the
arbitration award. See, e.g., Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 260
N.E.2d 508, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863, reargument denied, 27 N.Y.2d 737 (1970) (mem.), discussed
in The Quarterly Survey 45 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 536, 552 (1971) (where arbitration is not
consensual but imposed by statute, the courts can review the proceeding for reasonableness
and good faith in accordance with procedural and substantive due process).
114 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR §§ 7501, 7511 (1963); Bay Ridge Medical Group v. Health
Ins. Plan of Greater New York, 22 App. Div. 2d 807, 254 N.Y.S.2d 616 (2d Dep't 1964)
(mem.).
115 68 Misc. 2d 520, 327 N.YS.2d 285 (Rochester City Ct. Monroe County 1971).
116 N.Y, JuDIciARY LAw § 213(8) (McKinney Supp. 1971). The law is implemented in
22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 28.1 et seq. (1970). Note that since the case was transferred, submission to
arbitration could only be by stipulation of the parties. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 28.2(b) (1970).
117 68 Misc. 2d at 522, 327 N.YS.2d at 287.
118 CPLR 3211(a)(5), 3212.
119 68 Misc. 2d at 521, 827 N.YS.2d at 286.
120 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 213(8) (McKinney Supp. 1971) provides, inter alia, that "[a]
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resulting from an arbitration hearing and award is the same as that
of a judgment reached following a trial by traditional court pro-
cesses.1
121
The Rochester City Court is governed by the Uniform City Court
Act (UCCA). UCCA section 1401 gives the same effect to city court
judgments as to those of a state supreme court. 122 Thus, the city court
judgment (although a vicarious one by way of arbitration) was properly
given res judicata effect. Suppose, however, defendant owner-operator
had asked for only $500 in a personal injury action in small claims
court.123 What result?
Under the rules governing small claims, the court could compel
arbitration.124 The scope of judicial review would be expanded 125 and
the effect of the award would be severely restricted. 126 It is clear that
by operation of UCCA section 1808, the arbitration award would not
estop the plaintiff-corporation in subsequent litigation concerning the
defendant's negligence.127
This result is not a direct consequence of the relatively small
amount in controversy, but is due to the summary nature of the pro-
ceedings in small claims courts.128 UCCA section 1808 is designed to
guard against giving preclusive effect to a judgment based solely on the
judgment may be entered upon the arbitration award." 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 28.11(b) (1970)
provides for trial de novo on timely demand. Plaintiff-corporation failed to make such
demand.
12168 Misc. 2d at 522, 327 N.YS.2d at 287-88.
122 UCCA § 1401 provides that
[w]ithin the limits of its jurisdiction as defined in this act, the court shall have
power to render any judgment that the supreme court might render in a like case.
123 The small claims side of the city court is governed by UCCA art. 18. UCCA § 1801
defines a small claim as one for $500 or less exclusive of interests and costs.
124 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 28.2(a) (1970).
125 See Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 260 N .E2d 508, 311
N.Y.S.2d 863, reargument denied, 27 N.Y.2d 737 (1970) (mem.).
126 UCCA § 1808 provides that
[a] judgment obtained under this article may be pleaded as res judicata only as to
the amount involved in the particular action and shall not otherwise be deemed an
adjudication of any fact at issue or found therein in any other action or court.
127 See, e.g., Stern v. Hausberg, 22 App. Div. 2d 669, 253 N.Y.S2d 447 (1st Dep't 1964)
(per curiam); Supreme Burglar Alarm Corp. v. Mason, 204 Misc. 185, 122 N.Y.S.2d 398
(App. T. 1st Dep't 1953); Kroll v. Ippolipo, 184 Misc. 596, 54 N.Y.S.2d 743 (App. T. 1st
Dep't 1945) (per curiam); Roland Meledandri Inc. v. Kirtz, No. 183301-67 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
N.Y. County 1967); Rosen v. Parking Garage, Inc., 40 Misc. 2d 178, 242 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1963); Auster v. Princess Fabrics, Inc. 174 Misc. 1096, 22 N.YS.2d
686 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1940).
128 UCCA § 1804 provides, inter alia, that small claim hearings shall be conducted
"in such manner as to do substantial justice between the parties according to the rules of
substantive law and shall not be bound by statutory provisions or rules of practice, pro-
cedure, pleading or evidence . . ." (emphasis supplied). See Zaritsky v. Thrifty 381 Stores,
Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 149, 324 N.Y.S.2d 476 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1971) (per curiam); compare
22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 28.8 (1970), which provides that arbitration shall be conducted "with due
regard to the law and established rules of evidence .. "
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standards of "substantial justice."'1 2 9 But the conduct of the arbitration
hearing would be the same in a small claims action as it was for the
Rochester case. The only difference is that, whereas the arbitration
panel normally consists of three attorneys, claims for $500 or less are
before a single arbitrator.1 3 0 The Rochester rationale would not give
conclusive effect to such a proceeding. Even though the protection of a
party's rights might be as great in a small claims arbitration, the effect of
the award is equated to the judgment it replaces. As UCCA section
1808 limits the res judicata effect of small claims judgments, it should
similarly limit the effect of substitute small claims arbitration.
AxTCLE 42- TRL&L BY THE COURT
CPLR 4213(b): Decision of trial court must state the essential facts.
CPLR 4213(b) provides that the decision of the court in a non-
jury trial "may be oral or in writing and shall state the facts it deems
essential."1 31 Trial court decisions inadequately supported by findings
of fact are accorded one of three alternatives on appellate review:
reversal and remand for trial de novo; remand for further or amended
findings; and retention by the appellate court for its own findings of
fact.132 The disposition by the appellate court depends upon the degree
of inadequacy of the findings of fact. and the insufficiency of the
record. 13
In Nutone Inc. v. Bouley Co.,13 the trial court, in sustaining a
mechanic's lien for the plaintiff, neither made findings of fact nor
established any record whatsoever. The appellate court reversed the
decision and noted that issues were created which required factual
determination as to whether the plaintiff had performed his contractual
obligations with the defendant entitling the former to recover. The
129 Supreme Burglar Alarm Corp. v. Mason, 204 Misc. 185, 186, 122 N.YS.2d 398, 399
(App. T. 1st Dep't 1953).
13022 N.Y.C.R.R. § 28.2(a) (1970).
131 CPLR 4213(b); see 4 WK&-M 4213.07.
1324 WK&M 4213.09.
133 A new trial generally follows when the findings are unsupported by the facts and
the record gives insufficient basis of essential facts found by the court. E.g., Harris v. Doley,
22 App. Div. 2d 769, 253 N.YS.2d 645 (1st Dep't 1964); Driskell v. Alfano, 12 App. Div. 2d
973, 211 N.YS.2d 668 (2d Dep't 1961); Kundla v. Symans, 9 App. Div. 2d 1021, 194 N.Y.S.2d
251 (4th Dep't 1959). A remand to enable the trial court to formulate adequate findings
follows where the proper decision was reached but the findings are inadequate. E.g.,
Conklin v. State, 22 App. Div. 2d 481, 256 N.Y.S.2d 477 (3d Dep't 1965); Ahleim v. State,
21 App. Div. 2d 747, 250 N.YS.2d 242 (4th Dep't 1964). Occasionally, an appellate court will
prepare findings of fact when the trial court record is sufficiently complete although the
findings of fact are inadequate. E.g., Mellon v. Street, 23 App. Div. 2d 210, 259 N.YS.2d
900 (3d Dep't 1965).
134- App. Div. 2d -, 327 N.Y.S.2d 256 (4th Dep't 1971).
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